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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES ANDREW NARANJO, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20030677CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
first degree felony (R. 100). This court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that a citizen's 
call to the police, reporting an Hispanic male wearing a red 
jacket looking into car windows in a quiet parking lot, combined 
with the officer's observation of just such a person riding a 
bike across campus with a metal bar extending out of his back 
pocket created the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain the 
suspect? 
2. Was the officer justified in conducting a Terry frisk 
where defendant's ongoing behavior was aggressive and agitated 
and where he refused to comply with the officer's repeated 
requests to stop and show his hands? 
"[W]hether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness [.]" State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 939 (Utah 1994). This standard, however, "conveys a measure 
of discretion to the trial judge," falling short of a de novo 
review. Id. 
3. Did the officer conduct a proper Terry frisk when he 
lifted defendant's pant leg to check for weapons, where defendant 
was actively resisting the frisk, making it difficult for the 
officer to safely reach down to pat the ankle area? 
The standard of review articulated in State v. Pena, above, 
also applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
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The Utah statute granting peace officers the authority to 
frisk suspects for dangerous weapons provides: 
A peace officer who has stopped a person 
temporarily for questioning may frisk the 
person for a dangerous weapon if he 
reasonably believes he or any other person is 
in danger. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a first degree 
felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor (R. 1-2). Defendant filed a suppression motion (R. 
14-18). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 
112: 23). Defendant proceeded to trial (R. 113). The 
misdemeanor charge was dismissed, and a jury convicted defendant 
of the first degree felony (R. 50). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to five years to life in the Utah State Prison with 
credit for time served (R. 100-01). Defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal, and the case was poured over from the Utah 
Supreme Court to this Court (R. 103; addendum A). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On a quiet Sunday afternoon between semesters in January of 
2003, while on security patrol at Weber State University, Officer 
Valentine received a call from dispatch, reporting that "an 
individual had called in from the Social Science Building . . . 
and reported seeing a Hispanic male wearing a red type of jacket 
or coat that was looking in vehicles in the Al parking lot" (R. 
113: 18) .2 Officer Valentine left the building he was checking 
and immediately noticed a male matching the description riding 
his bicycle across a parking lot (Id. at 22). 
The officer got in his marked police vehicle and followed 
the individual - defendant - up a small access road (Id.). When 
he caught up with defendant, the officer "pulled up behind him 
and followed him for a short distance, 10, 15 feet and tooted my 
horn to let him know I was behind him" (Id. at 23-24). Defendant 
looked over his shoulder and stopped his bike. Officer Valentine 
exited his vehicle and "said something to the effect of I need to 
talk to you or can I talk to you for a minute" (Id. at 24). In 
1
 The facts are essentially undisputed, based on the 
testimony of Officer Valentine. The only other trial witnesses 
were the backup officer, who arrived after the central events had 
already transpired, and a state criminalist, whose testimony was 
limited to identification of the contraband as heroin. See R. 
113: 68-76, 77-93. 
2
 At trial, Officer Valentine recalled seeing someone riding 
a bicycle who matched this description when he first arrived on 
campus at about 7:45 that morning (Id. at 21). 
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response, defendant "gestured in a southwesterly direction and 
said that I'm just riding over here . . . and began to peddle 
away" (Id.). 
Officer Valentine got back in his car and followed defendant 
up a hill. He observed that defendant was holding the handlebar 
of the bicycle with one hand and talking on a cell phone with the 
other (Id. at 25). The officer also observed "what appeared to 
be a metal type of bar or object extending out of his rear back 
pocket" (IcL.) . 
Defendant was riding in the wrong lane of a two-lane road 
divided by a yellow line (Id. at 26). Accordingly, the officer 
looked down to activate his lights as a warning to anyone else 
who might be coming in the opposite direction (Id. at 26, 57). 
When he looked up, defendant had dropped his bicycle on the 
roadway and was approaching the officer's vehicle "in an angry, 
aggressive manner" (Id. at 27). The officer particularly noted 
defendant's "constant staring eye contact" and the "deliberate 
manner" in which he walked toward the police vehicle while still 
talking on the cell phone (Id. at 28). As defendant approached 
the passenger side of the stopped police car, he put his hand in 
a front pocket and then took it out again. The officer testified 
that defendant "appeared to be palming something from my view" 
(Id.). While the officer could not be sure what, if anything, 
defendant was holding, he was concerned that it might be a weapon 
(Id. at 28-29). 
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Now out of his vehicle, the officer spoke to defendant over 
his car, ordering him to step around to the front of the car and 
show him what was in his hand (Id. at 29). Defendant's response 
was loud, aggressive, and unintelligible (Id.). Eventually, 
defendant moved to the front of the car xx[i]n that same 
deliberate fast-paced walk" while the officer again ordered him 
to show his hand (Id. at 30). Rather than stopping at the front 
as directed, however, defendant continued on around the car 
towards the officer (Id. at 31). Not knowing defendant's 
intentions, seeing that defendant was not following his 
directions, and wary about defendant's ongoing aggressiveness, 
Officer Valentine drew his weapon and hung it down behind his leg 
(Id. at 32). When even this failed to stop defendant, the 
officer raised the weapon, pointed it at defendant, and again 
ordered him to stop (Id. at 33). 
Defendant stopped in his tracks about 5 to 6 feet away from 
the officer, tossed the item from his hand, and then began 
emptying his pockets on the ground, shouting, N>>Do you want to 
see what's in my pockets? I'll show you what I've got, this is 
what I've got'" (IdL. at 35). 
With undiminished apprehension about defendant's conduct, 
the officer ordered defendant to the ground. When defendant 
stopped throwing things from his pockets, he complied (Id. at 
36). Officer Valentine handcuffed defendant, helped him up to 
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his feet, and walked him to within 6 or 8 inches of the police 
car to frisk him for weapons (Id. at 37, 39). 
Officer Valentine described defendant as leaning towards the 
police car, ''pushing his hips into the rear quarter panel of my 
police car to prevent me from patting his front area, the 
waistband and pocket area" (Id. at 37). As the officer tried to 
frisk defendant, "[defendant] was trying to get [his hands] 
around to the side to the front area and he appeared to be 
digging in his waistband or trying to get into a pocket in the 
front" (Id^ _ at 38) . 
Working to forcibly control defendant's handcuffed hands by 
pulling them back towards the center of his body and holding them 
there, Officer Valentine "couldn't safely reach down and grab his 
ankle and feet" at the same time to frisk that area of his body 
(Id. 40). Accordingly, the officer "lifted up the pant leg to 
visually inspect the sock area" (Id.). When he did so, a bindle 
fell to the ground (Id.). 
As defendant continued to resist, Officer DeHart arrived to 
help (Id. at 43, 72).3 In order to control the struggling 
defendant, Officer Valentine took him to the ground by force, at 
which point Officer DeHart took over (Id. at 45). Officer 
Valentine then began collecting the items defendant had thrown, 
3
 Officer Valentine had called dispatch for back-up when he 
first ordered defendant to move to the front of the patrol car 
(R. 113: 43) 
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including a 13-inch black metal pry bar, a screwdriver, and a 
metal file (Id. at 46-47). When the officer picked up the 
bindle, defendant volunteered, "That's heroin," and told the 
officer he was a middleman, delivering the drug to someone at a 
nearby Chevron station (Id. at 47). He stated that he had the 
pry bar with him in case the individual to whom he was delivering 
the drugs became aggressive (Id. at 48) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Officer Valentine had reasonable suspicion to stop and 
detain defendant as he was riding away on his bicycle. First, 
defendant matched the description provided by the citizen who 
called the police with a report of someone peering into cars in a 
quiet parking lot. Second, the officer personally saw a metal 
bar sticking out of defendant's back pants pocket as he rode 
away. The fair inference from these facts is that defendant may 
reasonably have been suspected of using the metal bar to break 
into cars in the parking lot. Alternatively, defendant was 
violating the motor vehicle code, to which bicyclists are bound, 
by riding on the wrong side of the road and was also subject to a 
lawful stop based on this violation. 
The officer also had reasonable suspicion to frisk 
defendant. Defendant was acting aggressively and yelling 
unintelligibly, he appeared to pull something from his pocket 
that the officer feared might be a weapon, and he refused to 
comply with the officer's repeated instructions to stop and show 
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his hands. Considering defendant's agitated conduct and having 
no assurance that defendant was unarmed, the officer was 
objectively warranted in the belief that his safety was in 
danger. 
Finally, the officer did not exceed the limits of a Terry 
frisk for weapons when he lifted the leg of defendant's pants to 
visually inspect the sock area. Defendant's ongoing struggle to 
keep the officer away from his waist area created the situation 
necessitating the officer's action. Had defendant stood quietly 
as directed, the officer would have been able to conduct the 
frisk as defendant now claims he would have preferred. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A CITIZEN'S CALL TO THE POLICE 
REPORTING A HISPANIC MALE WEARING A 
RED JACKET LOOKING INTO CAR WINDOWS 
IN A QUIET PARKING LOT COMBINED 
WITH THE OFFICER'S PERSONAL 
OBSERVATION OF JUST SUCH A PERSON 
RIDING A BIKE ACROSS CAMPUS WITH A 
METAL BAR EXTENDING OUT OF HIS BACK 
POCKET CREATED THE REASONABLE 
SUSPICION NECESSARY TO DETAIN 
DEFENDANT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining 
that Officer Valentine had reasonable suspicion to detain him. 
Defendant contends that the undisputed facts simply do not 
provide the quantum of evidence necessary to establish reasonable 
suspicion. See Br. of Aplt. at 16-18. 
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The officer in this case stopped defendant twice: once when 
he honked briefly at him initially and again moments later when 
he turned on his overhead lights (R. 113 at 23-24, 26-27). The 
trial court properly determined that the first stop was a level 
one voluntary encounter and that the second stop was a level two 
detention supported by reasonable suspicion. See R. 113 at 23-
24 or addendum B. 
The standard for initially detaining an individual is well 
settled in Utah. An officer is permitted to stop an individual 
when "he has a reasonable suspicion to believe [the individual] 
has committed or is in the act of committing . . . a public 
offense." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999); see. also State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Carpena, 714 
P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986). In determining whether reasonable 
suspicion exists to temporarily detain a defendant, courts look 
to "specific and articulable facts, together with rational 
inferences from those facts, which warrant the intrusion." State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). If reasonable 
suspicion exists, the officer "has not only the right but the 
duty to make observations and investigations to determine whether 
the law is being violated; and if so, to take such measures as 
are necessary in the enforcement of the law." State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980) (quoting State v. 
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 
(1977)) . 
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The reasonable suspicion determination turns on the totality 
of the circumstances confronting the officer. State v. Humphrey, 
937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 1997). In considering whether the 
circumstances meet the threshold for reasonable suspicion, the 
appellate court "accord[s] deference to an officer's ability to 
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." United 
States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001), cert, 
denied, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002); accord State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 
506, 509 (Utah App. 1989)("experienced officers may be Aable to 
perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be 
wholly innocent to the untrained observer'") (citation omitted). 
Thus, "even ambiguous behavior, susceptible to an innocent 
interpretation, may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity depending on the totality of the 
circumstances." Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 
2000)(citing Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968)). Indeed, 
where defendant's conduct is "conceivably consistent with 
innocent . . . activity" but is also "strongly indicative" of 
criminal activity, Utah appellate courts will not hesitate to 
conclude that reasonable suspicion exists. Menke, 787 P.2d at 
541. 
In this case, a professor working in the social science 
building called the police to report that an Hispanic male 
wearing a red coat or jacket was looking into cars in a quiet 
parking lot on a Sunday afternoon (R. 113: 18). The fair 
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inference from the objective fact that the caller contacted the 
police is that he perceived the activity to be suspicious and 
thought it ought to be investigated. From even a layperson's 
point of view, looking into multiple cars in a deserted parking 
lot is simply not a normal activity. Cf. Holmes, 774 P.2d at 509 
(untrained observers may deem conduct innocent that a trained 
officers would interpret differently). 
Officer Valentine responded to the call from dispatch (Id. 
at 18). Almost immediately, he spotted an individual riding a 
bike across campus who matched the description. The officer 
followed him in his patrol vehicle and initiated a level one 
voluntary encounter by pulling up behind him and briefly honking 
his horn (Id. at 23). As was his right, defendant declined this 
voluntary encounter and rode away. He was free to leave and, in 
fact, left (Id. at 24). The law is well-settled that as long as 
a person "remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, 
there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy 
as would under the Constitution require some particularized and 
objective justification." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554 (1980). 
Thereafter, the officer continued to observe defendant. At 
this juncture, he noticed a metal bar extending out of 
defendant's rear pants pocket (Id. at 25). A fair inference from 
this fact, considered in conjunction with the earlier 
observations and report from the citizen who called the police, 
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is that defendant was carrying a tool with which to break into 
cars. See State v, Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah App. 
1994)(conduct observed or information relied upon need not be 
illegal to give rise to reasonable suspicion). At this point, 
the officer detained defendant, prompting the pivotal inquiry: 
xx
 [W] ould the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure . . . ^warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). 
The answer is plainly "yes." With the observation of the 
metal bar added to the citizen report, the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to believe that a crime may have been committed and 
that defendant may have committed it. In addition, defendant was 
in violation of the state motor vehicle code, a further 
justification for the stop. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
84(1)(1999)(providing that, with certain exceptions, persons 
operating bicycles are subject to motor vehicle laws); § 41-6-53 
(1999)(articulating duty to operate motor vehicles on right side 
of roadway). The officer, therefore, was duty-bound to further 
investigate the situation. Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 105 
(citation omitted). Accordingly, the officer activated his 
overhead lights. Coming after defendant's previous rejection of 
a voluntary encounter with the officer, the activation of the 
lights constituted a show of authority, signaling to defendant 
that he must stop and was not free to leave. Cf. State v. Moqen, 
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52 P.3d 462 (Utah App. 2002) (defendant not free to leave where 
officers left overhead lights on after returning driver's 
license). 
Because the undisputed facts established the quantum of 
evidence necessary to establish reasonable suspicion, Officer 
Valentine acted within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment when he 
detained defendant. Defendant's claim to the contrary is without 
merit. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S ONGOING AGGRESSIVE 
BEHAVIOR AND REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH 
THE OFFICER'S REPEATED REQUESTS 
JUSTIFIED THE TERRY FRISK FOR 
WEAPONS 
Defendant argues that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion to frisk him for weapons. See Br. of Aplt. at 18-22. 
This argument fails on the undisputed record facts. 
Both statutory and case law make clear that an officer may 
conduct a weapons frisk on an individual who has been properly 
stopped if the officer reasonably believes that he or anyone else 
is in danger. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ("The officer 
need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the 
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of 
others was in danger"); accord State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah 1986); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999). The officer's reasonable belief 
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must, of course, be supported by "specific and articulable facts" 
as well as the "rational inferences" that may be drawn from those 
facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. "Since no one factor is 
determinative of reasonableness, a trial judge must determine the 
reasonableness of a frisk in light of all the facts." Carter, 
707 P.2d at 659; accord State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 
(Utah App. 1997) (articulating totality of the circumstances 
test). 
In this case, the officer was confronted with a suspect who 
was aggressively striding towards him, making "constant staring 
eye contact" and yelling unintelligibly (R. 113: 27-29). As 
defendant approached the officer's vehicle, he put his hand in 
his pocket and then immediately withdrew it. He appeared to be 
"palming something" out of the officer's view, which the officer 
feared might be a weapon (Id, at 28). The officer ordered 
defendant at least twice to step around to the front of the 
vehicle and show his hands. At least twice, defendant ignored 
the order and continued his angry and aggressive approach (Id. at 
29-30, 32). The officer was concerned enough for his own safety 
to draw his weapon, at first holding it down behind his leg but 
ultimately needing to point it directly at defendant to compel 
him to stop (Id. at 32-33). While defendant then began emptying 
his pockets, the officer had no idea if defendant had discarded 
everything that might be a danger to him from the pockets (Id. at 
34-36). Under these circumstances, a reasonably prudent person 
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would most certainly "be warranted in the belief that his safety 
. . . was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. No more is 
necessary to justify a Terry frisk. 
POINT THREE 
THE OFFICER CONDUCTED A PROPER 
TERRY FRISK WHEN HE LIFTED 
DEFENDANT'S PANT LEG BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT WAS ACTIVELY RESISTING 
THE FRISK AND THE OFFICER COULD NOT 
SAFELY REACH DOWN TO PAT THE ANKLE 
AREA FOR WEAPONS 
Defendant contends that the officer exceeded the ambit of a 
proper Terry frisk by lifting one of his pant legs to check for 
weapons (Br. of Aplt. at 23). In defendant's view, this action 
exceeded the limited inspection of a suspect's outer clothing 
authorized by Terry and instead constituted a search requiring 
probable cause (Id. at 24).4 
Defendant's argument fails because he reads Terry too 
narrowly. Terry "is not authority for the proposition that an 
officer who has effectuated an investigatory stop of a 
4
 While a frisk in its most common form consists of a quick 
pat-down of outer clothing, the Terry court itself recognized 
this "apt description" of a frisk: "^[T]he officer must feel with 
sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A 
thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, 
waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and 
entire surface of the legs down to the feet.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 
17 n.13 (citation omitted). This description emphasizes the need 
for officers to frisk in a sufficiently thorough manner to ensure 
that they and those nearby will be protected from any weapons a 
suspect may be hiding. 
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potentially armed individual is necessarily limited, under all 
circumstances, to conducting a pat-down." Haves v. State, 414 
S.E.2d 321, 323 (Ga. App. 1991)(emphasis in original); cf. 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983) ("Terrv need not be 
read as restricting the preventative search to the person of the 
detained suspect"); U.S. v. Thomson, 354 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10 Cir. 
2003)(Terry rationale "not necessarily limited to a frisk of the 
person under investigation"). Rather, as noted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Terry "held that there ^is no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to 
search against the invasion which the search entails.'" Michigan 
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1046 (quoting Terrv, 392 U.S. at 21 
(citation omitted)). When, as in this case, 
the officer has a reasonable belief "that the 
individual whose suspicious behavior he is 
investigating at close range is armed and 
dangerous to the officer or others, it would 
appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the 
officer the power to take necessary measures 
to determine whether the person is in fact 
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the 
threat of physical harm." 
Id. at 1047 (citing Terrv, 392 U.S. at 24). 
The trial court understood the flexibility inherent in a 
Terrv frisk when it ruled that the frisk in this case was lawful: 
During the kind of stand-up part of the 
frisk, [defendant] tries to keep the officer 
from patting down his front waistband and 
pocket area of his jeans and the officer is 
still trying to see what's in [his] hand. 
And the officer testifies that he couldn't 
bend over safely to pat the pant leg because 
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he's holding [defendant's] handcuffed hands 
with one hand and he can't reach to his ankle 
area to pat down so he lifts up his pant leg. 
To me that seems reasonable and it seems to 
be in conformity with what Terry is trying to 
do and to avoid. It seems to me that's 
reasonable given all of these circumstances 
I've just described. 
R. 112: 25-26. 
The trial court's ruling is correct. The "sole purpose" for 
allowing an officer to conduct a Terry frisk "is to protect the 
officer and other prospective victims by neutralizing potential 
weapons." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36 $13, 78 P.3d 590 (citing 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) and Terry, 392 U.S. at 
24). Certainly, a proper Terry frisk "must be strictly ^limited 
to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which 
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.'" State v. 
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300 59, 77 P.3d 646. But whether a frisk 
is reasonable always involves an objective assessment of all of 
the circumstances facing the officer. Id. (citing Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21). 
Thus, in Terry, the officer approached defendant, grabbed 
him, and quickly patted him down. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. 
Defendant did not resist in any way, allowing the officer to 
complete the frisk with minimal intrusion. Under these 
circumstances, the court determined that a pat-down of 
defendant's outer clothing struck the appropriate balance between 
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the officer's need to search for weapons and the defendant's 
interest in bodily integrity. 
This case presents a markedly different set of 
circumstances. Rather than cooperating, defendant here resisted 
the frisk from the outset, pushing his hips towards the police 
car and forcing his hands around from his back, where they were 
handcuffed, to the side of his waist area (R. 113 at 37-38). 
Defendant's intentional actions hindered the officer from quickly 
and effectively completing the frisk. Indeed, he created a 
situation in which the officer was compelled to simultaneously 
control defendant's physical movements and frisk him for weapons. 
Under these circumstances, where the officer could not 
easily or safely reach down to pat defendant's ankle area for 
weapons, he instead briefly pulled up one of defendant's pant 
legs. While this movement was minimally more intrusive than 
patting the ankle area, it was necessitated by defendant's own 
refusal to quietly submit to a frisk. _See Hayes, 414 S.E.2nd at 
324 (where suspect resists frisk, officer may proportionately 
respond to suspect's actions); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 
U.S. 143, 148 (1972) (upholding seizure of gun from suspect's 
waistband without prior frisk because suspect failed to comply 
with officer's request to step out of car); State v. Warren, 603 
P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1979) (where suspect pushed officer's hand 
away during attempted risk, officer justified in reaching into 
bulging pants pocket). Moreover, the officer's conduct was 
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plainly more reasonable than the alternative - leaving the area 
uninspected and the officer vulnerable to possible attack from a 
secreted weapon. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, then, the officer's 
act of briefly lifting the leg of defendant's pants struck the 
appropriate balance between "the need to search against the 
invasion which the search entail[ed]." Long, 463 U.S. at 1046 
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Consequently, it constituted a 
proper Terry frisk. 
CONCLUSION 
The stop of defendant was legal because the officer had 
reasonable suspicion, based on a citizen report of suspicious 
behavior and the officer' s observation of a potential burglary 
tool in defendant's pocket, that defendant may have been 
burglarizing vehicles in a deserted parking lot. Alternatively, 
the officer also personally observed defendant violating the 
motor vehicle code. The subsequent frisk was legal, based on 
defendant's unpredictable, aggressive behavior and on his 
repeated refusal to follow the officer's orders. The scope of 
the frisk was also permissible because it was directly 
necessitated by defendant's ongoing resistance. Because all of 
the officer's actions preceding the discovery of the heroin were 
lawful, the drugs are admissible. Consequently, this Court 
should affirm defendant's conviction for one count of possession 
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of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a first 
degree felony. 
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cause. In fact, he didn't have a reasonable suspicion. No 
matter what the state says about Mr. Naranjo's behavior, he 
testified at the time he decided to conduct the frisk he 
had — saw no bulges, had no facts to rely on to believe the 
defendant at that time was presently armed and dangerous. 
Without that, he can't even frisk him, I think that's what 
he testified to. He saw no bulges. I went through that on 
cross-examination. He said he had no — nothing he could 
point to make him believe the defendant at that time was 
presently armed and dangerous. So the frisk even — even if 
the pull up of the pant leg wasn't a search, he still didn't 
have any reason to frisk him. We'll submit it on that, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, both. What I'd like 
to do is to take a short recess. I think I'm prepared to 
rule right now. I want to take a short recess, look at this 
case then I'll come right back out. Okay? We'll be in 
recess then for just a minute. 
(A recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you both for waiting. 
Let's wait for Mr. Naranjo. 
(The defendant enters the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: We have both attorneys and Mr. Naranjo 
back in court. Here is my decision, folks. It's an 
interesting case. Obviously much of this is new to me, not 
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just this case but the law, too, so it!s more difficult than 
it probably would be to somebody who's experienced, but here 
is what Ifm going to rule: ITm going to deny the motion to 
suppress, and I'm going to do so for these reasons — here's 
what I find to be the most important facts to me in making 
this decision: 
First of all, we've got a known informant who 
contacted — who is a criminal justice professor who contacts 
dispatch, describes a suspicious person looking in vehicles 
and gives a description of some clothing apparently. Then 
the dispatch relays that information on to the officer. The 
officer at the campus then as he's walking to his car, as I 
recall it, he sees a person who matches the description that 
he's been given from the dispatch. He gets into his police 
car, a marked car, pulls up behind the defendant who's riding 
his bike at that point. 
He does do this — what I think is really agreed upon — 
Level I stop at a point by either honking his air or car 
horn, stops the defendant who briefly says something to the 
effect of I'm going over there and points and then gets back 
on his bike and pedals away. He does pedal away in the 
opposing lane of traffic which would be a bit unusual. And 
the officer also notices a black object extending — a 
metallic object extending from the back pocket of 
Mr. Naranjo. 
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At that point — it seems to me it's undisputed at that 
point those facts. Both sides seem to agree that those are 
the fact at that point. Then the officer turns on his 
lights. Itfs unclear at that point if he knew more than what 
I!ve just recited or not, but to me that alone is 
sufficient — reasonable suspicion could be based on those 
articulable facts alone in my mind. 
At that point, when he turns on the light, his overhead 
lights, it does seem to me that!s a Level II stop at that 
point by turning those lights on. He does — and it?s 
unclear whether he sees the bicycle down in the travel lane 
on Dixon Drive whether that enters into his decision or not 
in turning on the lights, that was unclear to me at least 
from the transcript. 
But itfs clear at around that same point in time when 
he's turned on the lights that the defendant is approaching 
the officer, the officer describes it as aggressive, that he 
has an angry stare with him, he's yelling. He goes to the 
passenger side of the car, he sees Mr. Naranjo put his hand 
in his front pocket and comes out with something and he's 
concealing what that is from the officer's sight. 
And then when the officer gets out and he's talking to 
Mr. Naranjo, Mr. Naranjo is described as yelling at that 
point. He's asked to step around in front of the vehicle and 
keep his hands in sight. Mr. Naranjo disobeys that order 
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from the officer by continuing past the front of the officer, 
continues to come towards the officer and doesn!t show his 
hands and is still in an aggressive manner and the officer 
doesn't know the whereabouts of the metal object at that 
point still. 
The officer draws his weapon, puts it to his side of the 
officer, again tells Mr. Naranjo to stop and to show the 
officer his hands. Mr. Naranjo again disobeys that, that 
order from the officer. At that point, the officer then 
points his weapon at Mr. Naranjo and he stops. And the 
officer asked him what's in his hand and Mr. Naranjo responds 
by yelling and being aggressive and throwing things, 
scattering them around emptying his pockets, not throwing 
things at the officer but scattering them around the area. 
And the officer doesn't know what they are, he hasn't told 
Mr. Naranjo to empty his pockets. And then he orders 
Mr. Naranjo to his knees and, again, Mr. Naranjo -- up to 
this point he's disobeyed at least twice. This time he 
doesn't immediately obey but he does continue emptying his 
pockets first before he then goes to his knees. 
During the kind of the stand-up part of the frisk, 
Mr. Naranjo tries to keep the officer from patting down his 
front waistband and pocket area of his jeans and the officer 
is still trying to see what's in hand. And the officer 
testifies that he couldn't bend over safely to pat the pant 
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leg because he's holding Mr. Naranjofs handcuffed hands with 
one hand and he canTt reach to his ankle area to pat down so 
he lifts up his pant leg. To me that seems reasonable and it 
seems to be in conformity with what Terry is trying to do and 
to avoid. It seems to me that's reasonable given all of 
these circumstances that I've just described. 
For that reason, I find that the frisk is also 
supportable by what the officer -- what he knew personally 
and what he observed and his training and experience, I think 
it is in conformance with the idea that backs up Terry. 
And so that's my ruling and I'd ask that Ms. Neider 
prepare the — I suppose we need findings, conclusions, and 
an order to that effect. 
MS. NEIDER: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: Now is there any objection, Mr. Gravis, 
on including the — I think Ms. Neider wanted the audiotape 
included as part of the record? 
MR. GRAVIS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Since it was referred to in the 
transcript but I didn't see it there. 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, it was previously marked for 
purposes of the prelim so it doesn't need to be remarked I 
don't think. 
THE COURT: Just use it as the same exhibit number 
then as in the prelim. 
